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DoD Directive 8521.01E

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  • DoD Directive 8521.01E
    • Department of Defense Biometrics
    • 20 pages
    • Public
    • February 21, 2008

4. POLICY
It is DoD policy that:
4.1. Biometrics is an important enabler that shall be fully integrated into the conduct of DoD activities to support the full range of military operations.
4.2. DoD biometrics programs shall be designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of biometrics activities throughout the Department of Defense by eliminating unwarranted duplication and overlap of technology development and information management efforts. For this purpose, all DoD Components’ biometrics activities shall be coordinated through the DoD Biometrics Executive Committee (EXCOM).

4.2.1. Joint, Service, or common biometrics products, systems, and services shall be coordinated with the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics and acquired in accordance with procedures consistent with DoDD 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2 (References (j) and (k)). Consideration shall be given to available Government-wide and DoD enterprise acquisition vehicles and contracts when acquiring biometric products, systems, and services.

4.4. Biometric capabilities shall be developed to be interoperable with other identity management capabilities and systems, both internal and external to the Department of Defense, to maximize effectiveness. System development and capability implementation strategies shall be harmonized, integrated, and unified with identity protection and management stakeholder organizations to ensure consistency with DoD identity management principles, directives, and vision.

4.7. Authoritative sources of biometric data, associated information, and the means to exchange the data and information with Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign governmental or multinational agencies shall be maintained.


UK identity card image unveiled

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id-card-front_236Press Office
July 30, 2009

The image of the ID card for British citizens was officially unveiled by the Home Secretary today in Manchester and London.

The ID card, which can also be used as a travel document in Europe, was revealed by the Home Secretary at St Pancras International Station in London and to residents of Greater Manchester at an event in the city centre.

The ID card image shows the information contained on the face of the card, including photograph, name, date of birth and signature, and the card’s unique design. It will hold similar information to that currently contained in the UK passport as well as a photograph and fingerprints on a secure electronic chip – linking the owner of the card securely to their unique biometric identity.

Statement by the Home Secretary

Home Secretary Alan Johnson said, ‘The introduction of ID cards today reaches another milestone, enabling the people of Manchester to prove and protect their identity in  a quick, simple and secure way.

‘Given the growing problem of identity fraud and the inconvenience of  having to carry passports, coupled with gas bills or six months worth of  bank statements to prove identity, I believe the ID card will be  welcomed as an important addition to the many plastic cards that most  people already carry.

‘The fact that it can be used as a passport when travelling in Europe will be an added advantage.’

Latest security features

The new UK identity cards will feature the latest physical security features, which are designed to give the card’s owner and those being asked to accept the card maximum protection from identity fraud

or forgery, which costs the UK economy £1.2bn on average each year.

They will act as a proof of age, helping prove an individual’s right to enter premises or buy goods. They will also empower communities tackling anti-social behaviour and crime by allowing local retailers, including pubs and supermarkets, to make sure they aren’t selling restricted goods to those who are underage.

National Federation of Retailers and Newsagents spokesperson statement

‘Underage sales are a problem across the UK and we are always looking for new ways for the public, especially those under the age of 18 years old, to prove their identity.

‘As the cards use the latest security technology, retailers can be confident that the person in front of them is who they say they are. What’s more, UK citizens now have the option of using a document that’s very portable and extremely useful.’

Identity Commissioner

id-card-back_284The Home Office takes seriously the concerns that the public have over their information being stored securely and accessed appropriately. That is why an Identity Commissioner will be appointed before ID cards are introduced to oversee operation of the service and report annually on the uses to which ID cards are put and the confidentiality and integrity of information recorded in the National Identity Register. Public panel meetings in Manchester and London will allow the public to join a conversation about the National Identity Service so their views, reactions and concerns inform the way service is developed and delivered.

As the Home Secretary announced last month, the National Identity Service will be accelerated with UK citizens in the North West able to apply for a card in the New Year before full national coverage from 2012.  Details of how the introduction of ID cards for foreign nationals will be speeded up will be announced in the coming weeks.

The Home Office is also working closely with the Department for Transport and Manchester and London City airports on the development of plans to introduce improvements to the existing pre-employment checking and airside pass-issuing arrangements that will be possible with the introduction of identity cards for airside workers later in 2009. This includes plans for those holding an ID card to receive increasingly j

oined-up airport services by enabling them to confirm their identity quickly and securely as they move between aviation employers and airports across the UK.

Notes to editors

The National Identity Service will deliver recognisable benefits to residents, businesses and local authorities. They include:

  • a universal and simple proof of identity that brings convenience for organisations and individuals – that means an end to the disorganised use of photocopied bank statements, phone bills and birth certificates
  • ensuring that foreign nationals living, working and studying here legally are able to easily prove their identity and prevent those here illegally from benefiting from the privileges of Britain
  • travel in Europe, using the identity card which fits in your wallet or purse.

Delivery schedule:

  • from 25 November 2008 compulsory identity cards began to be issued to foreign nationals who come to the UK to work or study
  • in the first half of 2009 contracts were awarded for application and enrolment, biometrics storage systems and the production of passports
  • before the end of this year voluntary identity cards will be issued to airside workers – starting with an 18 month evaluation at Manchester and London City airports
  • volunteers in Greater Manchester will also be given the chance to enrol for the first identity cards. A further contract will be signed to cover production of cards for the medium term
  • from early 2010, identity cards will be issued on a voluntary basis to residents in the North West
  • from 2011/12 identity cards will roll out to the wider population on an entirely voluntary basis.

ID cards issued to airside workers will bring real benefits to employers, employees and the public. They will help:

  • improve the portability of reference checks between employers and airports, creating greater flexibility for employers and staff
  • kick start joint work to explore opportunities for streamlining airside pass regimes
  • give holders a highly secure and convenient identity document that can be used to prove their identity, and as a credit card sized travel document within the EEA for UK citizens.

The ID card design includes the Royal Coat of Arms on the front and features a floral pattern representing the four floral emblems of the UK: the shamrock, daffodil, thistle and rose.

To find out more about the National Identity Service and to register for updates about when it goes live in your area, visit the Directgov website (new window).

FBI Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification

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EBTSIEPD_20090611

NIEM Information Exchange Package Documentation

  • 56 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • April 17, 2009

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1 PURPOSE

The Federal Bureau of Investigation Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification is the method by which the Federal Bureau of Investigation supports the exchange of biometric data used to facilitate the determination of the personal identity of a subject from fingerprint, palm, facial or other biometric information, across criminal justice agencies or organizations that use an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) or related systems nationwide.

These biometric specifications are standards for electronically encoding and transmitting biometric image, identification and arrest data. The FBI EBTS is comprised of the biometric standards entitled “Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Other Biometric Information” (ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007), which are composed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in correspondence with The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). These standards define the content, format and units of measurement for the exchange of biometric information. The FBI EBTS serves criminal justice agencies in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Canada.

This Interface Exchange Package Documentation (IEPD) covers the FBI EBTS 8.1 XML Data Reference Model.

2 SCOPE

Data in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS) files are exchanged with and for the official use of criminal justice officials of local, state, and federal governments in the U.S. and its possessions and in Canada.

5 ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

5.1 Additional Property Definitions

The basic requirements for EBTS messages are Logical Records Type-1, Type-2, Type-4, Type-7, Type-9, Type-10, Type 13, Type-14, Type 15, Type 16, Type 17 and Type 99 set forth in the ANSI standards which are also applicable to transmissions to the FBI. The FBI-specific requirements for the contents and format of Logical Records Type-2, Type-7, and Type-9 as well as for any special requirements for the other record types, are captured in the business requirements for an EBTS transaction.

5.1.1 The EBTS Transactions

FBI CJIS Division will process the following seven types of fingerprint and four photo transactions from the four main service areas in its electronic environment. There are several types of transactions for each service area that will be accepted by the FBI, the sender must designate the Type of Transaction (TOT) in the Type-1 Record to specify the which process is to be followed.

Ten-Print Services

• Electronic Ten-Print Submissions enable users to submit ten-prints from live-scan booking terminals or card scanners at either the federal, state or local level.

• Remote Ten-Print Searches allow users to search existing records by electronically transmitting fingerprint images or remotely extracted fingerprint characteristics. The user can request specific finger images, up to all 14 fingerprint images, via the Fingerprint Number(s) Requested (FNR) field.

Latent Services

• Electronic Latent Submissions enable the agency having legal jurisdiction of the case, either federal, state or local, to submit latent prints (fingerprints, palm prints, toe prints, and footprints).

• Remote Latent Searches allow the agency having legal jurisdiction of the case,  either federal, state or local, to search existing records by transmitting latent print images or corresponding feature sets. The user can set the maximum number of candidate images to be returned via the Number of Candidate’s Images returned (NCR) field.

• Latent Image Maintenance Requests allow IAFIS users to specify transactions (delete or add confirm) related to an unsolved latent file.

Image Services

• Remote Requests for Fingerprint Images enable users to retrieve ten-print images from the FBI Criminal Ten-print Fingerprint Image Master File.

• Electronic Requests to Upgrade Fingerprint Images allow users to request fingerprint images on file at the FBI or to request updates of existing images.

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National Capital Region Electronic Designation and Validation of Federal/Emergency Response Officials

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MO Brief _ 06 18 09 v1

Missouri Responder Credentialing Strategy Meeting

  • 25 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • June 18, 2009

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Policy:Public Law 110-53 and supporting requirements

Process:Credential issuance, attribute registration, validation

People:Federal/Emergency Response Official (F/ERO) registrations

Products & services:FIPS 201 infrastructures and tool sets

Practice:NCRC validated demonstrations

Performance measures:Proven capability

Timeline:National roll-out plan

End state: Streamlined investment strategy

Public Law 110-53
“Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007”

I.Date of enactment: August 3, 2007

(1) Title IV SEC. 405. FEDERAL RESPONSE CAPABILITY INVENTORY

(2) Title IV SEC. 406. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

(3) Title IV SEC. 407. FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS

(4) Title IV SEC. 408. CREDENTIALING AND TYPING

(5) Title IV SEC. 409. MODEL STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORKERS

II.NLT August 2, 2008: The FEMA Administrator is to develop standards for credentialing and typing of incident management personnel, emergency response providers, and other personnel (including temporary personnel) and shall:

(1)provide the standards developed, including detailed written guidance, to

a) Federal agencies that have responsibilities under the National Response Plan and other personnel (e.g. National Infrastructure Protection Plan critical infrastructure/key resources, National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan essential government personnel)

b) State, local, and tribal governments

(2)provide expertise and technical assistance to aid Federal, State, local, and tribal government agencies with implementing the standard

(3)consult with the Secretary of Health and Human Services in developing standards for credentialing health care professionals

(4)establish model standards and guidelines for credentialing critical infrastructure workers that may be used by a State

III.NLT February 2, 2009: Each Federal agency with F/ERO responsibilities are to be credentialed and typed in accordance with the standards

(1) F/ERO personnel are to be registered in the database system (F/ERO Repository) for real time exchange of information and rapid validation of credentialed personnel

(2) F/ERO repository will be populated by Federal agencies via HSPD 12 Issuance Infrastructure

Personal Identity Verification Interoperability (PIV I)

Non-Federal Issuers (NFI) Identity Authentication PKI Certificate

NFI PIV Interoperable Cards:

  • must include an Identity Authentication PKI Certificate issued by a Certification Authority (CA)
  • chains to the Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) at the Medium Hardware assurance level via cross-certification

This will enable Federal government relying parties to:

  • verify the validity of the identity card via the Identity Authentication PKI Certificate
  • verify the issuing organization (i.e., CA cross-certified with FBCA)
  • be assured that the certificate (and by extension, the card) hasnot been revoked or invalidated since issuance

Identity Proofing

During identity proofing, the applicant is required to:

  • appear in person and provide two forms of identity source documents in original form from the list of acceptable documents included in Form I-9
  • At least one of the documents must be a valid State or Federal government-issued picture identification (ID)
  • This identity proofing process is commensurate with OMB Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Interoperability For Non-Federal Issuers

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(U//FOUO) Concept of Operations for Biometrics in U.S. Central Command AOR

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U.S. Central Command

  • 53 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • March 2007

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1. (U) Purpose. This Concept of Operations (CONOP) documents concepts and procedures for the use of biometric technologies to support identity superiority, protection and management in the entire USCENTCOM AOR. This CONOP focuses on the biometrics process and key systemic enablers. This CONOP contains UNCLASSIFIED and CLASSIFIED 100 annexes. The body of the CONOP is UNCLASSIFIED however, Annex E, “HUMINT Biometrics Management”, is CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN.

4.3 (U) Biometrics is means of identification that provides great confidence in the relationship between an identity and an individual. The associated history of a biometric identity can assist in the categorization of individuals as“Red,” “Blue,” or “Gray.” When properly collected and matched, biometrics routinely identifies an individual with a degree of certainty of over 99%. Unlike signatures or “flash to pass” ID cards, biometric samples cannot easily be faked. Unlike simple facial photos that change over time, a biometric proves more stable over time and cannot be easily duped through disguising.

(U) Biometrics is a force multiplier. By linking an individual to a history, a Commander has facts on which to base a decision. Biometric modalities provide faster screening while ensuring threatening personnel are  identified. Because an individual‟s biometric modalities are not easily “spoofed” or transferable to another individual, a biometrics reader in lieu of a „flash to pass‟ badge system is required. This type of verification allows the Commander to focus his forces on missions rather than determining the authenticity of credentials.

4.5. (U) Biometrics is also the only form of identification which, by its nature, is also evidence. By properly enrolling a person, a Commander can compare the match to previously collected data such as latent prints, previous detainments, and „watch lists.‟ A Commander can match an enrollment for base access or weapon card applicant against a historical latent print and use that history to deny access, and prosecute suspect individuals. Alternatively, biometrics systems can be used to exonerate innocent individuals by establishing irrefutable evidence of  time/location combinations that can be accessed after the fact.

5. (U) THE USCENTCOM Joint Biometrics Process

5.1. (U) The purpose of the USCENTCOM biometrics process is to enable the Commander to effectively categorize an individual as friend or adversary. With biometrics, the Commander can match an individual to historical data in order to confirm that person is who they claim to be and possibly determine past activity.

ISAF/DoD Biometrics Tracking Afghanistan Photos

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A British troop assigned to Royal Air Force II Squadron takes a photo of an Afghan detainee for biometric purposes, June 26, 2010, Dand District Kandahar, Afghanistan. RAF II Squadron partnered with the Afghan National Army 205th Corps and Afghan National Police to perform a joint patrol through local villages in search of insurgents, weapons caches and illegal drugs. As a result, three insurgents were found and detained, along with several pounds of marijuana. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Kenny Holston)(Released)

U.S. Army Pfc. Andrew Bock, with Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, uses Handheld Interagency Identification Detection Equipment (HIIDE) to gather information on an Afghan national during Operation Helmand Spider in Badula Qulp, Helmand province, Afghanistan, Feb. 15, 2010. HIIDE is a multimodal biometric system that collects and compares fingerprints and iris and facial photos against an internally downloaded biometric watch list. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Efren Lopez/Released)

PARWAN PROVINCE, Afghanistan –Patrolman Safidulla, an Afghanistan National Police officer from the Kuh-e Safi district, gets his biometrics put into a handheld interagency identity detection equipment database by 4th Platoon, Company B, Special Troops Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division Soldiers, at Dandar Patrol Base in Parwan, Afghanistan, Sept. 30. The system uses fingerprints, iris imaging and facial recognition technology and is similar to security measures for U.S. servicemembers and government employees obtaining work in their field. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. William E. Henry, Task Force Cyclon Public Affairs)

U.S. Army Pfc. Samuel R. Gronau collects biometrics from Afghan National Police (ANP) Col. Gul Mohammed in Taktehpol, Afghanistan, March 10, 2010. Gronau is assigned to Bravo Troop, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment and Mohammed is the commander of Taktehpol?s ANP division. (DoD photo by Tech. Sgt. Francisco V. Govea II, U.S. Air Force/Released)

A member of the Provincial Reconstruction Team uses the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) to store biometric information of the Road Maintenance Team (RMT) workers at Forward Operating Base Kutschbach, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan, 30 March 2010. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Horace Murray/Released)(100330-A-3996M-082)

100116-F-1020B-101 Kabul - Minister of Interior Mohammad Hanif Atmar sits for his Afghan Automated Biometric Identification System (AABIS) photo at the grand opening of the new biometrics center at the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Minister Atmar officially registered in the new biometrics system, as all MOI employees are required to enroll in AABIS. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown/RELEASED)

1006-N-6031Q-001 KABUL, Afghanistan -- Soldiers from the Afghan National Air Force participate in biometric data collection of their personal history, iris scan, thumb print, and urinalysis under a new accountability program in the Afghan Air Force. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class David Quillen/ RELEASED).

1006-N-6031Q-001 KABUL, Afghanistan -- Maj. Gen. Abdul Sabour, Director of INtelligence for the Afghan National Air Force participates in biometric data collection of his personal history, iris scan, thumb print, and urinalysis under a new accountability program in the Afghan Air Force. (US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class David Quillen/ RELEASED).

A soldier from 2nd Platoon, A Company, 1-503rd Infantry Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team enters a member of a private Afghan security company into the Biometrics Automated Toolset (BAT) Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) System near the village of Heyderk Hel, Wardak Province, Afghanistan, Feb.18, 2010. The BAT HIIDE System assists soldiers in community mapping. U.S. Army photo by Sgt Russell Gilchrest. (Released)

A British soldier with Royal Air Force II Squadron and Afghan National Police officers gather men from a village in Dand District to take their biometrics, June 26, Dand District, Kandahar, Afghanistan. RAF II Squadron partnered with the Afghan National Army 205th Corps and Afghan National Police to perform a joint patrol through local villages in search of insurgents, weapons caches and illegal drugs. As a result, three insurgents were found and detained, along with several pounds of marijuana.

Sgt. Nick Bender conducts an iris scan of an Afghan village elder's eye during a cordon and search mission Feb. 9, in Farah province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Marines use the Biometric Automated Toolset to identify Afghans by using fingerprints and iris scans. Bender is the Company-Level Intelligence Cell chief with Company I, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), the ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force - Afghanistan. The SPMAGTF-A mission is to conduct counterinsurgency operations, with a focus on training and mentoring the Afghan national police.

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Maxx A. Juusola, with Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, gives an Afghan man a free radio after inputting his data into a biometrics automated tool set near Marjah, Afghanistan, Feb. 22, 2010. The biometrics tool is used to easily identify Afghans in the local area. (DoD photo by Cpl. Albert F. Hunt, U.S. Marine Corps/Released)

A US Army soldier uses the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) system to create a biometric profile of a local villager. The data will be used to ensure security by preventing known threats from disrupting the village medical operation.

A US Army soldier uses the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) system to create a biometric profile of a local villager. The data will be used to ensure security by preventing known threats from disrupting the village medical operation.

100603-F-1020B-032 Kandahar - U.S. Army soldiers conduct biometrics registration at an Afghan National Army sub-station in Kandahar province June 2, 2010. U.S. Army and NATO forces are partnering with Afghan National Police throughout the city as part of the "Hamkari," or cooperation concept. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown/RELEASED)

DHS to Begin Testing Iris Scanners on Illegal Immigrants

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See also:

ISAF/DoD Biometrics Tracking Afghanistan Photos

A US army officer with the 101st Airborne Division Alpha Battery 1-320th takes an iris picture of an Afghan man detected with gunpowder on his hands, outside Combat Outpost Nolen in the village of Jellawar in The Arghandab Valley on September 5, 2010. The war in Afghanistan is nearing the end of its ninth year, with international troops at almost full strength of 150,000, from the United States and NATO. AFP PHOTO/PATRICK BAZ

Homeland Security to test iris scanners (USA Today):

The Homeland Security Department plans to test futuristic iris scan technology that stores digital images of people’s eyes in a database and is considered a quicker alternative to fingerprints.

The department will run a two-week test in October of commercially sold iris scanners at a Border Patrol station in McAllen, Texas, where they will be used on illegal immigrants, said Arun Vemury, program manager at the department’s Science and Technology branch.

“The test will help us determine how viable this is for potential (department) use in the future,” Vemury said.

Iris scanners are little used, but a new generation of cameras that capture images from 6 feet away instead of a few inches has sparked interest from government agencies and financial firms, said Patrick Grother, a National Institute of Standards and Technology computer scientist. The technology also has sparked objections from the American Civil Liberties Union.

ACLU lawyer Christopher Calabrese fears that the cameras could be used covertly. “If you can identify any individual at a distance and without their knowledge, you literally allow the physical tracking of a person anywhere there’s a camera and access to the Internet,” he said.

Scans will be tested on illegal aliens (UPI):

Illegal aliens in Texas will be used to test iris scanners as a quicker alternative to fingerprints, the Department of Homeland Security said.

The agency will conduct a two-week test of commercially sold iris scanners next month at a Border Patrol station in McAllen, Texas, USA Today reported Monday.

“The test will help us determine how viable this is for potential (department) use in the future,” said Arun Vemury, a program manager at the department’s science and technology branch.

The scanners are not widely used, but advances in technology allow cameras to photograph the eye at distances up to 6 feet, rather than the few inches required of older cameras, the newspaper said.

If successful, the scans could more quickly identify suspected terrorists, and others on federal no-fly lists, officials say.

Iris scans might be quicker than fingerprints.

DHS Testing Iris Scanners At U.S. Border (InformationWeek):

Iris scanners scan people’s eyes and record information for identity purposes. The technology is controversial and has raised privacy concerns and objections from groups like the American Civil Liberties Union.

The test is being run by the DHS science and technology (S&T) directorate and co- sponsored by the national programs and protection directorate and US-VISIT program, according to a privacy impact assessment. It also leverages the joint expertise of DHS, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Naval Academy.

The DHS is not disclosing which three companies’ technology will be used in the test, which will be conducted on illegal immigrants that are identified and processed at the McAllen station.

The information collected will be stored on a secure system that is not connected to the internet nor to any DHS system, according to the privacy impact assessment. Identifying information of those whose irises are scanned will not be connected to the scan information. All the information collected is merely to test whether iris scanners perform as they are expected to perform, according to the DHS.

DoD Biometrics HIIDE Device User Guide

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See also:

ISAF/DoD Biometric Tracking in Afghanistan.

Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment

  • 76 pages
  • © 2008 L-1 Identity Solutions Inc.

Download

The HIIDE includes two separate cameras for imaging an individual’s irises and face, and a sensor pad for scanning fingerprints. These three sensors capture the minute details of a subject’s iris, fingerprint and face, as digital photographs, or “scans.” The HIIDE™ translates the photographic data into a binary code and links that code to biographic data about the individual, such as name and a personal identification number. The HIIDE then processes the code and biographic data and builds a portfolio for the individual that is stored in a database.

Once an individual has had a record created, or has been “enrolled,” that individual is part of the HIIDE database. One can “recognize,” or confirm that individual’s identity in the future by comparing a live scan of the subjects: iris, fingerprints and/or face to the biometrics contained in the database.


IBM Testing Biometric Technology for Retail Advertising

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A screen on the I.B.M. Fashion Solutions Store display unit shows how biometric information is gathered. Photo I.B.M./New York Times.

Biometrics Take on a New Style (New York Times):

Here on the outskirts of Milan, I.B.M. is working on a way to mesh retail and technology that, if successful, will produce a new market for its technology and place biometrics — automated ways of recognizing humans based on physical or behavioral traits — in the forefront of retail marketing.

While retail biometric projects have been tested for more than five years, it has not managed to make the leap to large-scale implementation. Discussion has centered on ideas like linking somebody’s bank account to a reading of their eyes or fingerprints, which would speed up checkout time — appealing to some, downright disturbing to others, and not really an issue because the technology is not yet sufficiently refined.

The I.B.M. solution, at least at this point, involves tracking biometrics through a mini camera in a mannequin’s eye or placed somewhere in a store.

There are two tests going on in Milan, one for a fashion company’s flagship store and the other, in an electronics store. The clients have sworn I.B.M. to secrecy for fear of customer backlash, although I.B.M. promises that the data is collected only in aggregated form and cannot be traced to any individuals.

“We started with fashion because it is a creative and innovative industry, but it’s clear that people have to be educated so they know their privacy will not be compromised,” said Enrico Bozzi, the manager of I.B.M. Forum Milano, the department that developed the technology. “It is a question of changing people’s perception.”

While many companies are developing commercial uses for biometrics, including the information technology company Unisys in Pennsylvania, I.B.M. may be the first to create biometric applications that high-end fashion companies and other retailers can use to refine marketing. Most companies have been focusing on biometrics for security purposes, like employing iris scanners for access to restricted areas.

Once shoppers can be tracked, the next step could be advertisements selected to match biometric triggers: A customer walks into a shop and a piped-in voice asks if the jacket she bought last time has been satisfactory and would she like to see something similar from a new line. (Tom Cruise’s character received the same treatment in the 2002 movie “Minority Report.”)

While none of the applications have been sold yet, “we’re not talking about the future, this is available now and ready to be deployed,” said Marco Fregonese, strategy and change leader for I.B.M. Global Business Services.

FBI Identification Division Fingerprint Training Manual July 1987

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Identification Division Technical Section

  • 109 pages
  • July 1987

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(U//FOUO) U.S. Army Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) Smart Card

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Center for Army Lessons Learned

  • 2 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • February 2007

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DHS Future Attribute Screening Technology Mobile Module (FAST M2) Overview

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Future Attribute Screening Technology Mobile Module (FAST M2)

  • 13 pages
  • May 2007

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DHS Social Network Analysis, Behavioral Threat Detection, Biometrics Presentation

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DHS Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division

  • 48 pages
  • May 2009
  • 5.3 MB

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(U//FOUO) Iraq Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) HIIDE Standard Operating Procedures

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Multi-National Forces West Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) SOP and TTP

MNF-W Biometric SOP 43 pages Version 1, June 2007 Download
MNF-W Specific Modified Training Techniques and Procedures (TTP’s) 103 pages Version 1, Part II
June 2007
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U.K. Home Office Draft Statutory Guidance on National Security Retention of Biometric Data

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The following draft guidance was released by the U.K. Home Office on March 26, 2013 and concerns retention periods of biometric data in cases involving national security determinations.

Protection of Freedoms Act 2012: Draft statutory guidance on the making or renewing of national security determinations allowing the retention of biometric data

  •  29 pages
  • March 2013

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2. This guidance is to provide direction to any police force or other law enforcement authority regarding the retention and use of biometric material for national security purposes through the making or renewing of a national security determination (“a NSD”).

3. This guidance is issued pursuant to section 22 of the 2012 Act, which places the Secretary of State under a duty to give guidance about making or renewing of a NSD under the provisions set out in section 20(2)(a) of the 2012 Act.

4. This guidance is publicly available and, in particular, should be readily accessible by members of any police force or law enforcement authority seeking to extend the permissible period of retention, for national security purposes, of DNA profiles or fingerprints which they have hitherto retained.

Law enforcement authorities

5. Only a law enforcement authority listed under section 18E(1) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 or specified in any order made by the Secretary of State under that section may make or renew a NSD.

Effect of guidance

6. This guidance is admissible as evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. If any provision of this guidance appears relevant to any court or tribunal considering any such proceedings, or to the Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (“the Biometrics Commissioner”) overseeing the relevant Part of the 2012 Act, it can be taken into account.

7. A law enforcement authority may also be required to justify, with regard to this guidance, the retention, destruction or use of material held pursuant to a NSD, where appropriate.
Material to which this guidance applies

8. Part I, Chapter I of the 2012 Act provides for the making or renewal of NSDs for biometric material acquired under specific legislation. The retention periods and the relevant legislation are provided for by Part I, Chapter I of the 2012 Act and are set out at Chapter 2 of this guidance.

Extent

9. This guidance extends to the United Kingdom and applies to all relevant law enforcement authorities within it.
Purpose of guidance

10. The purpose of this guidance is to:

• Set out the basic principles that underpin the powers of a responsible Chief Officer or Chief Constable authorised to make or renew a NSD extending the retention of biometric data.
• To set out the threshold for making or renewing a NSD and the way in which those powers may be exercised.
• To promote the fundamental principles to be observed by those authorised to make or renew a NSD under provisions mentioned in section 20(2)(a) of the 2012 Act and to ensure the effectiveness of the use of those powers to retain biometric data for national security purposes.
• To ensure that any interference with the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) of persons to whom the data belongs is necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law.
• To confirm that a responsible Chief Officer or Chief Constable is required to justify the use of such powers, in relation both to the making or renewal of individual NSDs and the general pattern of their use, to the Biometrics Commissioner or in court. Any misuse of those powers is likely to be harmful to national security (particularly counter-terrorism) and to undermine public confidence in those law enforcement authorities permitted to exercise such powers. All Chief Officers or Chief Constables authorised to make or renew NSDs must be able to explain and justify their decisions to exercise those powers to the Biometrics Commissioner.

Retention Periods

21. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 prescribes the periods for which certain types of biometric material may be retained. The 2012 Act amends the system in England and Wales governing the retention of DNA and fingerprints taken from those persons who are arrested for, but not convicted of an offence. This is in order to ensure that DNA and fingerprint material is only retained indefinitely where a person has been convicted of crime, or for a specified period where a person has been arrested for, but not convicted of a serious offence.

22. This means that the police and other law enforcement authorities may:

a) Retain indefinitely DNA and fingerprints taken from those persons who are convicted of a recordable offence (or an offence punishable by imprisonment in Scotland), but may not retain material indefinitely for those who have not been convicted of an offence;
b) Retain for a limited period (in most cases up to 3 years) DNA and fingerprints taken from those persons who are arrested but not convicted of a serious offence (i.e. a qualifying offence);
c) Retain DNA and fingerprints taken from those persons arrested but not convicted of a minor offence (i.e. non-qualifying offence), for a reasonable period where this is for the sole purpose of conducting a speculative search against existing holdings of biometric material;
d) Retain material taken from juveniles (persons under the age of 18 at the time of their arrest or detention) only in certain circumstances – taking account of the ages at which peak offending occurs, the findings of the European Court of Human Rights in S & Marper v UK which made special reference to children and the retention of the DNA of non-convicted children, and the provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;
e) Retain material given voluntarily but ensure it is destroyed as soon as it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken, unless the person to whom it belongs is previously or subsequently convicted of a recordable offence, in which case it can be retained indefinitely; and
f) Retain material with the consent of the person to whom that material belongs as long as that person consents in writing to its retention (although a person may withdraw his or her consent at any time and if they do such material must be destroyed).

23. In addition, the police and other law enforcement authorities must:

g) Destroy DNA a sample as soon as a profile has been derived from it or within 6 months of it being taken – whichever is sooner.

Extended retention for National Security Purposes

29. The 2012 Act amends various pieces of legislation dealing with the retention, destruction and use of biometric material and in doing so also allows for DNA profiles and fingerprints taken or obtained under relevant legislation, to be retained for an additional period of up to 2 years for national security purposes. This period of extension is renewable. Such extensions are overseen by the Biometrics Commissioner, who has the power to order destruction of retained material where they consider that the criteria for extended retention have not been met.
30. A summary of the retention periods for England, Wales and Northern Ireland and for the separate system in Scotland is set out at Annex D.


(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Biometric Enabled Intelligence (BEI) and Forensic Enabled Intelligence (FEI)

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The following instruction is part of a series of “limited release” DoD doctrine publications that are not released to the public.

DoD Instruction O-3300.04: Defense Biometric Enabled Intelligence (BEI) and Forensic Enabled Intelligence (FEI)

  • 23 pages
  • For Official Use Only
  • May 25, 2012

Download

1. PURPOSE. This Instruction:

a. Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for management and execution of BEI and FEI and support to DoD identity intelligence (I2) activities in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 (Reference (a)), DoDD 8521.01E (Reference (b)), and DoDD 5205.15E (Reference (c)).

b. Establishes the DoD Identity Intelligence Steering Committee (DI2SC) as the primary advisory body to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) on BEI, FEI, and DoD I2-related issues.

c. Establishes a project office within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to coordinate and synchronize BEI and FEI activities.

2. APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “DoD Components”).

3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:

a. (FOUO) BEI and FEI are strategically important identity discovery and identity resolution intelligence processes used to unambiguously identify persons, networks, and populations of interest who pose potential threats to U.S. forces and national security.

b. BEI and FEI shall be fully integrated into Defense Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Component activities as an essential element of national security and in support of the full range of military operations consistent with national, defense, and operational priorities. BEI and FEI capabilities shall:

(1) Fuse BEI and FEI with associated contextual data and other available intelligence (e.g., document and media exploitation, signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT)) to support irregular warfare (IW) in accordance with DoDD 3000.07 (Reference (d)), and counter human network operations that include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, counterpiracy, and countersmuggling.

(2) Require coordination at all levels of operations, tactical to strategic, and between intelligence and criminal justice entities, to ensure the requisite depth of knowledge of current threats, while protecting intelligence sources and methods and criminal case integrity.

c. BEI and FEI policy, program, and technology development processes, and information management efforts shall be fully integrated with the DoD Biometric and Forensic Enterprises consistent with law and DoD policy and shall:

(1) Pursuant to References (b) and (c) control DoD biometric and forensic material and data collection, transmission, storage, caching, tagging, and use through DoD-approved national, international, and other consensus-based standards, protocols, best practices, and equipment to ensure consistency and support interoperability.

(2) Develop interoperability with other identity and intelligence information management capabilities and systems, both internal and external to the Department of Defense, to maximize effectiveness.

(3) Use BEI and FEI concepts and capabilities across all DoD activities including doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities; policy; exercises; experiments; and applicable plans.

d. (FOUO) Effective BEI and FEI is an integral part of the DoD Biometric and Forensic Enterprises. In addition to the traditional intelligence cycle functions, BEI and FEI shall:

(1) Collect, digitize, and transmit biometric data at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

(2) Leverage non-intelligence (i.e., common and digital multimedia) forensics material, data, and processes for intelligence purposes consistent with Reference (c).

e. Collection, retention, and dissemination of U.S. person information shall be in accordance with Executive Order 12333 (Reference (e)), DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (f)), DoDD 5400.11 (Reference (g)), and DoD 5400.11-R (Reference (h)).

f. Nothing in this Instruction shall supersede the roles and responsibilities of the Heads of the DoD Components to exercise their authorities pursuant to References (b), (c), and DoDD 5105.21 (Reference (i)).

(U//FOUO) FBI Next Generation Identification Overview July 2013

Sandia National Laboratories Mobile Biometric Device Technology Study

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Despite being labeled as only authorized for dissemination to U.S. government agencies and their contractors, the following document was obtained from the website of the Department of Energy’s Office of Scientific and Technical Information.

Mobile Biometric Device (MBD) Technology: Summary of Selected First Responder Experiences in Pilot Projects

  • 62 pages
  • Further dissemination only as authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors; other requests shall be approved by the originating facility or higher DOE programmatic authority.
  • June 2013

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Mobile biometric devices (MBDs) capable of both enrolling individuals in databases and performing identification checks of subjects in the field are seen as an important capability for military, law enforcement, and homeland security operations. The technology is advancing rapidly. The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate through an Interagency Agreement with Sandia sponsored a series of pilot projects to obtain information for the first responder law enforcement community on further identification of requirements for mobile biometric device technology. Working with 62 different jurisdictions, including components of the Department of Homeland Security, Sandia delivered a series of reports on user operation of state-of-the-art mobile biometric devices. These reports included feedback information on MBD usage in both operational and exercise scenarios. The findings and conclusions of the project address both the limitations and possibilities of MBD technology to improve operations. Evidence of these possibilities can be found in the adoption of this technology by many agencies today and the cooperation of several law enforcement agencies in both participating in the pilot efforts and sharing of information about their own experiences in efforts undertaken separately.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

The first responder law enforcement community is increasingly interested in mobile biometric devices (MBDs)—handheld devices that gather fingerprint, iris, facial, and other biological information about subjects in the field and communicate with remote databases to rapidly provide information that can help identify the subject. To help the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) formulate future requirements for MBD for first responders, Sandia National Laboratories in July 2010 (under HSHQPM-09-X00028-2) undertook the Mobile Biometrics Device Test and Evaluation (MBD T&E) project.

Approach

This project ultimately led to a variety of operational end-user evaluations on state-of-the-art biometric devices in collaboration with a number of federal, state, local, and specialized law enforcement agencies, as shown in Table ES-1. The objective of these evaluations was to test the MBD in operational environments and gather user feedback on performance and usage of, and potential improvements to, the devices to increase their value to the first responder law enforcement community.

Findings

The MBD T&E project acquired substantial information and data on the current use of mobile identification technologies in the field by first responder law enforcement jurisdictions in the United States. A summary of these findings follows:

1. MBD technology is considered important to operations and officer efficiency.

From the first responder perspective, introducing state-of-the-art MBD technologies into operations in the form of limited test and evaluation activities is important to understanding the possibilities and limitations of current and emerging biometric technologies. This perspective is underscored by the fact that more than 50 jurisdictions expressed interest in participating in the MBD T&E pilot project and that many of these jurisdictions had already decided to introduce mobile identification (ID) technology into their field operations. Moreover, the agencies that had sufficient infrastructure to participate found the pilot experience extremely helpful, as indicated in the following email of January 17, 2013, from Assistant Chief of Police Paul McDonagh of the Seattle Police Department:

“…The Pilot Project surrounding the Mobile Identification Device funded under DHS was a success on a number of fronts.

First it highlighted the emerging technology, and how the technology could be control for access to protected information. While we tested one product, in our group discussions we determined any future devices and the vendors can be varied to fit the task assignment of the officers – provided the specifications to communicate from each device to legacy system match the technical specifications.

Different size and capabilities of the devices are required for different police functions: bike officers, patrol officers, detectives. As example this became apparent with our pilot devices. They were a little larger than convenient to carry while operating on a bicycle and smaller units would provide them with the same capability. However, the officers would use the larger devices if they did not have access to the smaller sizes.

This highlights the next point: this pilot reduced the officer out of service time to determine identity. Officers stayed in the field where they can continue to work higher crime areas and back up other officers. This has a larger impact on police services in the future as we face reduced staffing and increasing demands for police services….”

Officers involved in this pilot believe this is a valuable tool that when put into place, with the necessary policy and procedures for use, will greatly enhance officer safety and effectiveness in the field.

The project was, for our purposes, successful and we are researching how we can provide this capability to our officers long term.

2. MBDs are used by first responders today in some jurisdictions; these jurisdictions represent a small percentage of total law enforcement agencies.

MBDs have been used since as early as 2002 by law enforcement state and local first responders. Current regular use of MBDs relies on intermediate communication links and Wi-Fi proximity to either Blackberries or patrol car mobile data terminals. [See “The Evaluability Assessment of Mobile Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)” at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/afis.pdf] These devices are limited to a single modality (fingerprint). However, the major providers of these devices also offer the capability to display mug shots and criminal history information associated with a fingerprint directly on the device or on the intermediary communications display. These devices have also demonstrated the capability of accessing authoritative criminal justice databases from the field, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Repository of Individuals of Special Concern (RISC). Day-to-day use of facial recognition capability from the field appears to remain limited and confined to only a few jurisdictions. Facial recognition, however, is available through alternate communication means, such as transfer of JPEG or other files from cell phone or social networking sites. The jurisdiction leading the implementation of facial recognition as a daily tool and facilitating adoption by other jurisdiction is the Sheriff’s Office of Pinellas County, Florida.

State and local officials see the advantages of expanding the capability of mobile wireless devices to permit identity checks from anywhere in the field, outside of the range of a patrol vehicle or intermediary communication devices. However, they stress that the ultimate utility of such capability resides in access to authoritative criminal justice/terrorist databases, such as FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and the forthcoming FBI Next Generation ID. The Washington State pilot had access to a regional data repository: the Western States Identification Network covering seven western States. The Collin County, Texas, pilot had access to the FBI RISC database, as well as the database of the Texas Department of Public Safety.

Perhaps the heaviest user of MBD field identification is the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office (LASO), which also manages the Los Angeles Regional Identification System (LACRIS). LASO reports that between July 1, 2006, and January 15, 2013, more than 40 jurisdictions within LA County using some 2,500 devices (BlueCheck) conducted 326,342 mobile identification searches that garnered hits or matches in 121,995 instances. LASO did not keep records on the disposition of identifications in the field (detain or release subject).

Additional information was provided from the Michigan State Police (MSP). That department deployed a number of the IBIS Extreme MBDs and reported that for seven months in 2012, troopers conducted 778 roadside searches, with 293 identifications. Like LASO, the MSP does not keep specific records on the disposition of identifications in the field. MSP did provide the following perspective on the advantages of mobile ID capability when asked to address return on investment:

“…We do not have detailed statistics on how many times this roadside identification saved the officer from transporting to a live scan device when not needed. We also don’t have detailed information on how many times identification was made to a wanted person which may have been released if the officer did not have a Mobile Identification device. From our perspective 778 times last year this device assisted the officer in either saving drive time, taking an officer off the road when not needed or identifying a person that had a warrant or needed to be detained based on information that was returned because of Mobile ID. If positive identification is needed without Mobile ID would easily take an officer out of service for an hour per incident. There are additional costs related to the vehicle, gas and ware. The cost of releasing a person with a warrant is not easily measurable and in some cases this could easily justify the costs of Mobile ID…”

3. MBD technologies can support efforts to prevent terrorism, but DHS first responder state and local partners require better access to data repositories containing information on known or suspected terrorists.

DHS components most directly engaged in the mission to prevent and identify the entry into the United State of terrorists and other threat individuals or groups participated in the MBD T&E pilot project to varying degrees. The initial use of MBD under this project—to support DHS Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations (Southwest Border Intelligence Coordination Unit) in detention centers—led DHS ICE to plan for MBD use in future operations. Toward the end of the project, ICE was considering introduction of MBDs in each of their detention facilities, an effort being coordinated with the ICE Biometrics Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) program. In addition, Operation Tormenta, conducted by the Customs and Border Protection Office of Border Patrol (CBP OBP), provided information on future mobile identification requirements, and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) continues to evaluate MBDs for both enrollment and identification in maritime environments.

4. MBD Technology Pilot preparation is complex.

Initial planning, coordination, staging, and training are essential to a successful pilot program. Even in cases that benefited from DHS partner “champions,” the process involves complete awareness and support throughout the entire organization, from first responder law enforcement agency management to the IT managers to the officers/agents using the device. However, overcoming these challenges—which requires understanding all stakeholder equities, with special detailed attention to technical questions and policy concerns—can potentially provide a payback by preparing agencies to evolve into institutionalized test beds for future biometric technologies. This lesson reflects the large issue of developing and implementing a reliable operational test and evaluation of biometric technologies discussed in the recent report of the National Academy of Sciences on Biometric Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities 2010.

5. MBD technology can improve field operations and achieve cost savings for departments and agencies.

DHS components and partners believe MBD can improve forensics in the field and potentially save time and reduce costs in both the homeland security and criminal justice processes. For example, stakeholders have noted MBD’s potential for improving “forward echelon” reporting on processing aliens of special interest where a 24-hour limit on detention is a factor; point of encounter/identity adjudication for large groups of apprehended aliens to determine most efficient transportation routing; book and release in the field to avoid transport to detention facilities for non-felonies; and special event management. Nonetheless, certain DHS CBP components have noted MBD capability gaps in after-action reports. DHS partners are pursuing MBD technical research on the value communicating latent prints images directly from the field to data repositories for much earlier investigative actions up to, but not including, arrest. Use of MBD technology also requires subsequent Latent Print Examiner review and matching of the print images obtained by the mobile device.

6. MBD technologies for subject/suspect/detainee enrollment in the field is currently of definite interest to a limited number of certain law enforcement first responder stakeholders who have also identified a need for a truly integrated MBD that uses fingerprint, facial recognition, iris recognition, and voice recognition technologies. Many DHS enforcement components are interested in the use of MBD for enrollment as well as for identification at the “point of encounter” in the field of subjects in the field. However, attitudes are mixed. Specifically, after evaluating the SEEK II designed specifically for enrollment operations, the  Michigan State Police indicated they did not plan to implement such a capability in future operations, but were very well satisfied with the capability to conduct identity checks in the field. In contrast, via email received on January 16, 2013, the Los Angeles County Regional Identification System Manager states:

“LA is VERY interested in enrollment in the field. One example, we would like to conduct a complete field booking (capturing demographics and biometrics – fingerprints with appropriate subject acquisition profile level, photographs, iris, voice, on a portable device) and release on their own recognizance, when appropriate, without the officer having to take the suspect to a brick and mortar booking location.”

Conclusions

  • Near-term efforts (five years or less) should focus on improving fingerprint collection in the field at the point of encounter with subjects or suspects.
  • Enrollment in an actual field environment is of limited interest to the state and local first responder law enforcement community. However, DHS components such as the USCG (Mona Pass) and CBP OBP (Tormenta) expressed interest in at least monitoring this capability and participating in pilot activities with these types of devices. DHS ICE also expressed interest and participated at various stages of the pilot, but confined their use of MBDs associated with this project inside the United States (SEEK II) to the “ID only” function.
  • The quality of cell phone cameras makes both facial recognition and iris recognition a real potential for field operations in the future. Nonetheless, integrating biometric modalities other than fingerprints in the context of mobile operations is problematic. Some jurisdictions are using facial recognition and incorporating iris recognition into their booking systems, but these modalities appear restricted to highly controlled environments.
  • Officer safety will remain the most critical factor in a jurisdiction’s decision on whether to adopt mobile ID with expanded modalities.
  • A separate report that documents use of MBD use in crime scene investigation and imaging of latent prints may be of value to crime scene first responders (Evidence Technicians). The context for such “cutting edge” crime scene mobile ID application should recognize the priority assigned to latent print searches by large (state and federal) AFIS systems.
  • Use of MBD in emergency evacuation scenarios involving jails or jail environments—the West Virginia “Mock Prison Riot” and Gwinnett County, Georgia, jail emergency evacuation exercise—were documented in separate contract reports under this project.

FBI Next Generation Identification Video Presentations

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The following videos are derived from presentations posted on Prezi.com by FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Communications Officer Gene Weaver.  A ZIP archive containing PDF versions of the presentations is also available (15.9 MB).  Thanks to members of Occupy Oakland for helping with the production of these videos and PDFs.

Overview Presentation

www.youtube.com/watch?v=v731lezshlc

Nick Megna UC Face Presentation

www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3UZvUAXMC0

Crime Scene Presentation

www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y_fz_Ufuj4s

Afternoon Presentation

www.youtube.com/watch?v=iscOu20mN88

Morning Presentation

www.youtube.com/watch?v=NOOxUN_3Ln8

Restricted U.S. Army Special Forces Handbook for the Fingerprint Identification System

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TC 31-20-2 Special Forces Handbook for the Fingerprint Identification System

  • 50 pages
  • Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program
    or by other means.
  • September 2008
  • 3.05 MB

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1-1. Special Forces (SF) Soldiers use various biometric identification systems in SF operations. Biometric applications are fundamental to a wide array of SF operational activities, including, but not limited to, the growing field of SF sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and the range of unit protection activities. SSE applications include the identification of enemy personnel and cell leaders in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment following tactical operations, particularly during direct action missions. Unit protection applications include maintaining databases on the identities of both United States Government (USG) and local national personnel. A routine example of protection applications for biometric data include the requirement to maintain isolated personnel report (ISOPREP) cards, which are fundamental to personnel recovery (PR) operations for the recovery of isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) personnel; ISOPREP cards are essential for the authentication of the IMDC individual. Another example of the use of biometric identification in SF operations is for positive identification of local national workers in a combat environment at an SF tactical facility, such as at a firebase. Whether in a garrison or combat environment, the collection, transmission, and storage of biometric data is a critical and common component of SF unit operations.

1-2. The most common and reliable means of identifying a person through biometric means is by the fingerprint identification system (FIS). Since 2001, SF has principally used technological (digital) means to take and transmit fingerprints to an automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS). However, although there are many technological capabilities to accomplish this task at the disposal of U.S. forces, it may not always be feasible to use advanced technological means to take, transmit, and/or store fingerprint data. Therefore, SF Soldiers—particularly the SF intelligence sergeants, military occupational specialty 18F—must be familiar with both the traditional (manual) means of fingerprinting and with the modern (digital) means available to Special Forces operational detachments (SFODs). Therefore, this TC covers both manual fingerprinting systems and some of the current digital systems available to the SFOD.

1-3. Manual FISs are still required in a wide array of SF operations. For example, situations may arise when digital FIS equipment or adequate power supply is inoperable, damaged, or not properly calibrated—simply put, there are times when even the most advanced and useful technology fails. In addition, given that the vast majority of SF operations are conducted “by, with, and through” indigenous forces, SF has a requirement to train, assist, and advise host nation (HN) regular and/or irregular forces who require FISs, but do not have advanced technological means. Likewise, even when digital FISs are available and the HN assets are capable of using them, it may be impractical or unwise to hand over these instruments. An example of this would be in an unconventional warfare environment; it may not be advisable to give digital FIS equipment to an irregular asset. In such a case, it may be necessary for the SF Soldier to read fingerprints from a paper provided by the asset. Some of the factors that must be considered before coming to this conclusion include the following:

  • What is the classification restriction of the equipment and its capabilities?
  • What are the consequences to the irregular asset and the USG if the asset is caught with this equipment?
  • How hard is it to replace this equipment if it is turned over to the asset?
  • Is there an available funding authority to procure the necessary equipment for indigenous personnel?
  • Can the linkage of this equipment to the United States be avoided if necessary?
  • How likely is it that the equipment is available to anyone other than the United States?
  • How likely is the discovery of this equipment and its capabilities to cause embarrassment to the United States or its allies?
  • How difficult is it to maintain the equipment and is the asset capable of accomplishing that maintenance without assistance?
  • Is there another alternative to accomplish the task without losing physical control over the technical equipment?
  • With all of these factors taken into consideration, is there a nontechnical means to accomplish the task which will reduce the various risks and is less resource intense?

1-4. In the event the irregular asset provides a set of prints on a plain piece of paper or other suitable surface, the SF Soldier must be able to read, categorize, and format the prints in order to transmit them to the AFIS for positive identification. The information in this TC is designed to enable SF Soldiers to become familiar enough with the FIS to not only use the equipment and techniques, but also to train an irregular asset to provide this service, such as when operating as part of an unconventional assisted recovery team (UART) in a PR scenario. These are critical skills; in the case of a UART, the SF Soldier accomplishing this task will have to be proficient enough in the FIS to successfully complete the authentication of the IMDC individual.

1-5. This TC explains how to take a set of fingerprints, read the fingerprints manually (when necessary), and transmit the results. Transmission includes the proper message format for transmitting FIS data over radio when fully digital file transfer capability is not available.

FINGERPRINTING BASICS

1-6. Manual FISs are the most basic and are still an effective means of identification. For many years fingerprinting was—and even in the United States sometimes still is—performed manually without the aid of current technology. There remain dedicated assets within the USG (the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], for example) that can manually read fingerprints. Although technological mechanisms involving a live scan of a fingerprint to the Biometric Fusion Center (BFC) are routinely capable of receiving and validating the fingerprints in less than 10 minutes, even manual FIS validation can be relatively quick. Under ideal conditions and with a clear set of fingerprints, the manual technique can take as little as 30 minutes when properly done. Even without a live scan device, fingerprints taken by a manual FIS may be transmitted and analyzed using digital devices. Once captured, the fingerprint must be photographed and scanned to send it over the portal or read and converted into a message format for transmittal over a tactical radio or phone. This hybrid manual/digital approach offers added flexibility and a relatively rapid response to the SFOD.

1-7. Traditionally, ink and paper are used to capture fingerprints. This method can be done on living and deceased suspects. When traditional ink and cards are not available, field-expedient methods are applied. Blank paper may be used in the absence of a fingerprint card—lined paper should be avoided. Substitutes for ink can be lipstick, charcoal, camouflage paint, magic marker, and even blood.

1-8. Standard ink and the standard FBI applicant card (covered in Chapter 2) should be used whenever possible. The FBI applicant card can be scanned and photographed as is for transmission to the BFC because the FBI card is a known size and shape. Fingerprint cards from other countries require a scale in the photograph or scan.

1-9. A metric scale should be in the photo or scan. Even if the scale is not metric, it gives the examiner a reference. When there is no metric scale available to use, a common item to size the print must be included, such as a dollar bill scanned with the print, to provide a reference.

1-10. Lifting a fingerprint is easiest when done from a smooth (nonporous) object. Semi-porous and porous objects generally require chemicals; therefore, they must be sent to a lab for proper processing. If the item cannot be removed, a photograph may be the only way to retrieve the fingerprint.

1-11. In the event a traditional latent print cannot be lifted and it is necessary to photograph the print, the following are some of the keys to taking a quality photograph of a fingerprint:

  • Latent images need to be 1000 pixels per inch (ppi) and a file type of Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) 2000, Tagged Image File Format (TIFF), or bitmap (BMP). The image should not be saved as a Portable Document Format (PDF) or regular JPEG.
  • A scale should always be included in the image—preferably metrics rather than inches. The scale should lay flat on the same plane as the latent print for proper calibration. If the technician reading the print cannot accurately calibrate for size, the AFIS search will be inaccurate.
  • When photographing, the camera should be mounted on a tripod and at a 90 degree angle so that the lens is parallel to the latent print being photographed to prevent parallax distortion.
  • Since images can only be posted to the portal one at a time, each image should be labeled beginning with a case number and then the image number so that multiple postings can be associated with one case; for example, 07-101-2 = case #07-101, latent image 2.
  • One of the most common mistakes when powdering latent prints is to over-powder. Less powder is usually better. A little more powder can be added if the print is too light. Too much powder, however, can fill in the furrows and obscure the fine detail of a fingerprint.
  • The technician should not twist the fingerprint brush between his fingers when powdering (like the actors do on television). This method reduces the control over the brushing motion and can damage the print, as well as pull powder between the ridges into the furrows, reducing the quality. It is best to start brushing lightly in an area and when ridge detail begins to appear, try to brush with the ridge flow, not against it.
  • Sometimes multiple lifts of the same latent can be taken. This would be done, for example, when it looks like there is too much powder. After one lift, the technician should try to “clean up” the print by lightly brushing with the ridge flow and not adding more powder to the brush—it should still have some powder on it from the previous “dusting,” and then take a second lift to see if the quality improves. The technician must be sure to always clearly mark on the lift card if multiple lifts are taken of the same latent so that if someone is identified, it does not look as if they were identified to multiple latents when in fact it is just one. The technician should always ensure a photograph is taken before attempting to “improve” a print in the event the attempt results in irreparable damage to the quality of the print.

1-25. No matter how definite fingerprint rules and pattern definitions are made, there will always be some patterns causing doubt as to their classification. The primary reason for this doubt is that no two fingerprints will ever appear that are exactly alike. Other reasons are differences in the degree of judgment and interpretation of the individual analyzing the fingerprints. The correct interpretation of patterns that are questionable because of their resemblance to more than one pattern type is determined by the analyst’s proficiency in determining focal points, cores, and deltas. The more skilled the analyst is in reading the prints, the fewer questionable patterns are encountered. For positive identification, there is no allowable error for the type of print. The print may be questionable and stated as such in the FIS message. In questionable prints, the procedures described below help to identify the individual.

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